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Book Reviews 
Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection, by julia Kristeva, translated by 
Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. Pp. 248. 
$19.95. 
Desire in Language. A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, by julia Kris-
teva, edited by Leon S. Roudiez, translated by Alice jardine, Thomas Gora, 
and Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Pp. 336. 
$20.00. 
"L'Abjet d'amour." Tel Quel91 (Summer 1982), 17-32. 
Kristeva's latest work to be presented in English-Desire in Language and 
Powers of Horror, published in 1980 and 1982 by Columbia University Press 
-displays the contestatory force of "semiotics" as she has succeeded in de-
fining it (since La Revolution du langage poetique, in 1974): as the analysis of 
"signifying practices" conceived to include psychical processes and literary 
style as well as language and ritual. In addition to a long-standing commit-
ment to the study of literature, Kristeva has specialized technical competence 
in linguistics and psychoanalysis. Her semiotic approach consists in making 
each of these commitments displace and redefine the others. Strikingly, it is 
the commitment to literature, or, in the Russian Formalists' phrase, to "poetic 
language"-rather than the analytical and demystificatory discourses of lin-
guistics and psychoanalysis-that turns out to be most disruptive. Kristeva 
unsettles some habitual assumptions about the value of literature and literary 
study. In "The Ethics of Linguisitcs" (DL, p. 25), she writes, "we must ana-
lyze those elements of the complex operation that I shall call poetic language 
(in which the dialectics of the subject is inscribed) that are screened out by 
ordinary language, i.e. sodal constraint. ... The term 'poetry' has meaning 
only insofar as it makes this kind of studies acceptable to various educational 
and cultural institutions. But the stakes it entails are totally different; what is 
implied is that language, and thus sociability, are defined by boundaries ad-
mitting of upheaval, dissolution, and transformation." Far from ensuring the 
endurance, through historical change, of values grounded in conditions of 
meaning determined by the nature of language, literature testifies to the in-
stability of the conditions of signification: the fragility of the Symbolic order 
itself, the instability of the structuring of the symbol or sign as a vertical, hi-
erarchical relationship between signifier and signified-the very condition of 
I language and meaning. 
It should be stressed that more than avant-garde literature is at issue here, 
although for Kristeva it is the writing of authors such as Lautreamont, Ar-
taud, Mayakovsky, Beckett, Celine, and Philippe Sollers that best exemplify 
! poetic language, and Celine is the subject of the second half of Powers of Har-
! rar as well as a key chapter in Desire in Language. Discussions of infantile lan-
guage in chapters addressing Melanie Klein and Freud and of the novel in a 
,I 
,I 
J 
chapter on Bakhtin make it clear that the signifying processes Kristeva seeks 
to evoke characterize not just avant-garde writing or poetry, but language as 
such. For critical purposes, Kristeva distinguishes signifying practices she 
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calls "translinguistic" from the narrowly conceived "language" of a linguis-
tics focused on the stable hierarchical sign. Literature exposes the instability 
of "language" and the heterogeneity of the signifying process. 
Literature means the crisis of meaning. Kristeva puts this conception 
bluntly: literature entails crisis for social political institutions as well as for 
the speaking subject: "by its very economy." Kristeva asserts, "poetic lan-
guage borders on psychosis ... and totalitarianism or fascism" (OL, p. 125). 
Instead of leading her to turn away from literature, however, to the authority 
of theoretical discourses claiming to analyze and diagnose (not evoke or ex-
emplify) "the horror," this acknowledgment rather leads Kristeva to try to 
make psychoanalysis and linguistics (if not anthropology and political 
theory) responsive in their very foundations to the significance of that which 
it is the privilege of literature to signify: "the meaning as well as the power'; 
of horror (PH, p. 208). 
Horror, or the more complex phenomenon of "abjection," becomes Kris-
teva's subject as she undertakes to describe the subjective experience of the 
primal process of separation that underlies and undermines the differentia-
tions of fully constituted language and society. Like BataiIIe, who focused on 
the horror and desire evoked by the undifferentiated, Kristeva interrogates 
horror as a primary force of separation between the human and the non-
human. Bataille noted that the taboo on excrement is so fundamental a divi-
sion between the human and the animal that it is never even classified as a 
taboo (L'Erotisme, p. 239). Kristeva begins an account of religious ritual with 
an interpretation of rites surrounding defilement, which replay "the demar-
cating imperative," the imperative to build up dividing lines between society 
and nature "on the basis of the simple logic of excluding filth" (PH, p. 68). 
Kristeva had argued (in La Revolution du langage poetique) that the Symbolic 
process (the establishment of sign and syntax, of grammatical and social con-
straints) takes place in dialectical conflict with a process prior to it, "the se-
miotic," a "mapping" of the instinctual drives, which persists in the 
rhythmical and phonic dimensions of language. This primal differentiation is 
first of all the mapping or zoning of the infant's body by the mother, into a 
territory having surfaces, orifices, and insides. Language is based upon this 
primal mapping and always risks collapsing into it. Defilement rites serve to 
keep paternal law distinct from maternal authority, to keep the Symbolic or-
der distinct from the semiotic order in which it is rooted but which it must 
repress so as to impose the primacy of the condition of meaning proper, the 
vertical dimension of the sign. 
Kristeva's argument here is congruent with Derrida's analysis of the role of 
disgust in Kant's system of taste (and moral judgment), where the disgusting, 
alone, is excluded from the possibility of becoming beautiful in a representa-
tion; disgust serves to defend us against a more irremediable decomposition 
of identity and the power of identification. Thus it goes along with that 
pmvcr, as its "other." In these essays, Kristeva is not only stressing the other-
ness of abjection but also analyzing, like Derrida, the complicity between dis-
gust and "the hierarchizing authority of the logocentric analogy" (Derrida, 
"Economimesis," Diacritics 11:2 (1982), 25). Three chapters in Powers of Hor-
ror describe Hindu, Jewish and Christian ritual as functioning "to effect an 
abrcJction of the pre-sign impact, the semiotic impact, of language" (p. 73). 
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Finally, defilement rites may be said to be a kind of writing-insofar as "they 
parcel out, demarcate, delineate an order, a framework, a sociality, without 
having any other signification than the one inhering in that very parceling"; 
and writing can be seen as "a second level rite, at the level of language": a 
process "which causes one to be reminded, through the linguistic signs them-
selves, of the demarcations that condition them and go beyond them" (pp. 
74-75), the semiotic order associated with maternal authority. 
The imagination of writing as rite exemplifies Kristeva's "translinguistic" 
approach, requiring that linguistics take into account the speaker's existence 
in the realms marked out by anthropology and history. At the same time she 
asks that anthropological data be made to address a psychoanalytic question: 
"what effects and especially what benefits accrue to the speaking subject from 
a precise symbolic organization"? "What desiring motives are required to 
maintain a given social symbolics"? (PH, p. 67) What aside from institution-
alized force makes a given form of patriarchy hold up? To feminists, 
Kristeva's answers may look dangerously like an apologia for the foundation 
of culture upon the suppression of women; the "benefits that accrue to the 
speaking subject" may seem to accrue overwhelmingly to subjects who are 
male. But while Kristeva follows Levi-Strauss in conceiving of social struc-
tures as symbolic systems linked to the universal order of language, she 
distinguishes between any particular "social-symbolic system" and the signi-
fying process as such, "the only concrete universality that defines that speak-
ing being" (PH, p. 73). Kristeva's focus on "desire in language"-on desires 
sustaining a social-symbolic system-is designed precisely to emphasize any 
such system's mutability as a "possible variant within the signifying process," 
to stress in any form of patriarchy its historicity and susceptibility to change, 
not its identity with an immutable linguistic order. 
What makes Kristeva's argument problematical as feminist theory is her 
commitment to analyzing "the speaking subject"-a sexual subject, yet one 
related only through the most complex mediations to gendered persons fill-
ing social roles. She means to describe both the subjective and the social-as 
a symbolic system that corresponds to a specific structuration of the subject 
within language. That conception of subjectivity is not easily linked to 
"subjective experience" in the ordinary sense of the thought and feeling of a 
person in a particular situation, and indeed this social-subjective dimension is 
left out of account, in what seems a crying omission, to a feminist reader, 
particularly in the key chapter on ritual, since the social practices it interprets 
(the taboo on incest, the taboo on menstruation) impinge so differently on 
men and on women. Kristeva seeks rather to describe the feminine, the ma-
ternal and the paternal as they are symbolized by any speaking subject in a 
particular social-symbolic order. Thus the multiple ambiguity of her subtitle 
-"An Essay on Abjection" -is not resolved but determinedly sustained: she 
writes at once of the action of casting off or rejecting, the action of degrading 
or abasing (as psychic and as social mechanism), that which is cast off or re-
jected, and the state of being cast off or abased. 
The "abject" is what is not, or not yet, an object. Kristeva's interpretation 
of the social and psychological phenomenon is in fact based on a psychoan-
alytic argument, on a critique of object-relations theory. Kristeva rereads 
Freud-on phobia, narcissism, and identification-to describe processes prior 
--------------~:~ 
196 Criticism, Vol. XXVI, no. 2: Book Reviews 
to the constitution of an object or a subject. For Kristeva as for Lacan, rela-
tions to objects are secondary to symbolization, to a relation toward lan-
guage. Hence she sets out to examine the economy of narcissism and of 
phobia "in the elaboration and practice of the symbolic function" (PH, p. 63). 
Here Kristeva's reflections are largely a critical rethinking of the theories of 
Melanie Klein. Klein departed from Freud not only in affirming the existence 
of the ego and of objects for the infant's drives and defenses from the very 
beginning of the infant's life; she also focused attention on the all-importance 
in this earliest phase of the mother, marked already by a third term (as in the 
Oedipal phase), the mother's desire, fantasized by the infant, for the phallus. 
Kristeva offers her own account of this structure-as the infant's primary dif-
ferentiation of an abject, rather than rapport with an object-in an essay pul;>-
lished last year in Tel Quel, "L' Abjet d'amour." 
Chapter two of Powers of Horror challenges object-relations theory by ex-
amining the link between the object and fear. Kristeva rereads Freud's "Anal-
ysis of a Phobia of a Five Year-Old Boy" (the case of "little Hans") to suggest 
that phobia arises, ultim'ately, not from the fear of an object but from the fear 
of the loss of object, the fear of drives which exceed any object. Little Hans's 
fear of horses "becomes a hieroglyph that condenses all fears, nameable and 
unnameable"; it is "a metaphor taxed with representing want itself," rather 
than the want of a particular object (PH, p. 35). The phobic's metaphor is in-
adequate, strained, and insufficiently metaphorical-partly object, partly 
sign. Freud's treatment consists in substituting another metaphor which rein-
forces the symbolizing agency productive of metaphors: he emphasizes how 
little Hans is ruled by love and fear of his father, and interprets his fear of 
horses as fear of castration. Kristeva's point is that the law of the Father at 
the basis of the Symbolic order is fragile and forced. But it is necessary for 
generating metaphors, the relief for fear. The phobic's feared objects are hier-
oglyphs or a "proto-writing," objects as signs; "the writer is a phobic who 
succeeds in metaphorizing" (p. 38), and all writing is a language of fear, not 
a relation to objects but a writing of want as such. 
Here as in the chapter on defilement rites we find Kristeva's characteristic 
move: examining a social or psychical mechanism, she recognizes it as a kind 
of language or writing, and redefines language in terms of the specific signi-
fying function this mechanism has disclosed. Such a proceeding does evoke 
the disparate and conflicting functions that enter into language or significa-
tion, the "heterogeneity" that Kristeva makes it her goal to describe. Yet this 
heterogeneity is evoked most exactly, in fact, where her reflections do not 
complete this movement-where they stop short of redefining language so as 
to include a peculiar psychical or social mechanism-because it is in terms of 
language alone, or more exactly in the terms of rhetorical theory, that certain 
functions would have to be described. Kristeva does not have recourse to 
rhetorical terms in her interpretation of narcissism, but her psychoanalytic 
critique of the notion of "immediate identification" -common to Freud and 
to Hegel, she suggests-leads in that direction. For this reason as well as for 
its clarity on the constitution of the maternal as the abject, one wishes that 
the essay "L'Abjet d'amour" could be included as an appendix in Powers of 
Horror, though it was not part of the original book. 
"L'Abjet d'amour" describes the psychical process from which all manifes-
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tations of abjection would derive, the infant's identification of the maternal 
as "abject" in the moment of identifying with the paternal function or the 
phallus which is the mother's desire. Such a preoedipal triangle is outlined 
by Melanie Klein. But Kristeva differs with Klein in dwelling upon Freud's 
naming and placing of this moment: as "primary narcissisrn/' situated after 
auto-erotism and before any object-cathexis. Freud distinguishes narcissism 
from auto-erotism by its introduction of a "new psychic action" -a third 
term added to the auto-erotism of the undifferentiated two, infant and 
mother. Primary narcissism, then, is the first institution of a Symbolic 
(triadic) order. Kristeva shows how the most contested premise of psychoan-
alytic theory, the primary status of narcissism (rather than object-relations or 
Girardian "mimetic desire") converges with the most radical premise of lin-
guistic theory, the constitutive status of the bar or the gap between signifier 
and signified and between sign and meaning (rather than the mimetic or re-
ferential dimension of language), or what is known since Saussure as "the 
arbitrary nature of the sign." Kristeva makes the psychoanalytic premise pro-
vide an answer to the question posed by the linguistic one: How is the gap 
constitutive of meaning psychically sustained? The answer will be, by means 
of primary narcissism, the advent of which establishes and screens over the 
first gap or difference, between what is not yet an ego and what is not yet an 
object, between the il1falls and the "abject." 
Kristeva exposes the tension as well as the complicity between the linguis-
tic and the psychoanalytic account of the primary condition for relations of 
meaning. She draws attention to the typical features of Freud's explanation of 
how the crucial gap is sustained. An account of that primary psychic struc-
ture prior to any object-relations appears in a key paragraph in chapter three 
of The Ego and the ld, describing the origin of the ego ideal in "the individu-
al's first and most important identification" (Standard Edition, XIX, p. 31). 
This is a "direct and immediate identification"-not, like later identifications, 
the outcome of an object-cathexis. It is the individual's "identification with 
the father in his own personal prehistory." Thus what "On Narcissism" led 
one to conceive as the identification of a gap now gets described as an identi-
fication with the father. 
Kristeva seeks to explain, rather than to interpret, the disparity between 
the two accounts. But she zeroes in on the claim that the identification is 
"immediate." This is not a coup de force, an imposition of an a priori (" AA," 
p. 21), comparable to the move Heidegger interrogates in "Hegel and the 
Concept of Experience," the assertion of the subject's immediate knowledge 
of the immanent presence of the Absolute. Freud's text, Kristeva suggests, 
makes this "immediacy" susceptible to analysis. For the "Vater der person-
lichen Vorzeit" means, in psychoanalytic terms, the father whom the infant 
inherits (not the father he comes to know): the phallus or the Imaginary Fa-
ther whose image is relayed by the mother's desire for something other than 
mother and child. The "immediate identification with the father," a concept 
vital for Freud's interpretive constructions, for an account of the emergence 
of the ego and the super-ego, is dependent upon this elaboration of the func-
tion of the preoedipal mother. 
To see what lies implicit in Freud's concept of "immediate identification" is 
to see the derivative and improper status of the leading terms of this account, 
---------------------------~ 
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Kristeva argues. Neither an "object" nor "identification" is properly in play 
in this primary transformation, the separation of being and desire and the 
constitution of that separation as an absolute. A more adequate term-still 
Freud's-would be "transference." Kristeva's essay, which sets off from a re-
reading of the same passage in the third chapter of The Ego and the Id cited 
by Melanie Klein in "The Origins of Transference," ends up by rewriting that 
reading as "Transference at the origin." What is the significance of this rever-
sal, whereby the term that usually refers to a repetition (a carrying-over into 
a later relationship of the desires and defences that characterized an earlier 
one) has to be employed to designate the first relation? (In this reading, the 
ego ideal, moreover, emerges prior to the ego itself.) Kristeva writes, "A not-
yet identity (that of the infant) transfers, or rather displaces, itself to the site 
of an Other which is not libidinally invested as an object (it is precisely its 
not entailing object-investment that justifies, it seems to me, the term dis-
placement rather than transference for this primary identification), but which 
nonetheless remains the condition for an ideal of the ego" ("AA," p. 22). 
Kristeva's hesitation between the terms "transference" and "displacement" 
r~calls Freud's at first sight unsystematic alternation between the two terms 
(Ubertragung and Verschiebung) in The Interpretation of Dreams, where "trans-
ference" refers, not to the patient's relationship to the analyst, but to the dis-
placement of psychical intensity from one idea to another. The term 
"transference" appears instead of the term "displacement" when Freud de-
scribes the displacement of intensity from an "unconscious" to a "precon-
scious idea," or from an "important" idea to a "trivial" one (as when Freud 
describes repressed ideas' "need for transference" onto the "day's residues"). 
Transference, that is, refers to the displacement from one "idea" to another of 
a different order: it is a displacement between signifier and signified, in the 
vertical, hierarchical structure of the sign ( ~). Such "transference" is neces-
sary, writes Freud in The Interpretation, for ideas to enter consciousness at all. 
"Unconscious ideas" are those subject to the primary process of sheer dis-
placement (Verschiebung)-an S .. S .. S ... ; consciousness requires the primary 
repression whereby one site is deemed superior to another, made to stand as 
the signified of a signifier. In Kristeva's terms, the semiotic is repressed in fa-
vor of the Symbolic. It is here that the "arbitrary nature of the sign" emerges: 
in the primal repression with which primary narcissism-of the ego ideaI-
coincides. 
But more interesting here than the coherence of Kristeva's argument are its 
hesitations, its alternations among the terms "identification," "transference," 
and "displacement" to characterize accession to the possibility of significa-
tion. These make up a system, as Freud's usage suggests. In using the same 
word, transference, to refer to the displacement of intensity among signifiers 
and to the displacement of authority among parent-figures (from parent to 
analyst, or in Lacan's phrase, among sujets suppose savoir), Freud implies the 
inevitability by which the latter is invoked to guarantee the former-for 
sheer displacement is not as such, it must be deemed to be, symbolization (as 
Freud deems the "preconscious" idea, or signifier, "trivia}," the "unconscious 
idea," the signified, "important"): sheer juxtaposition or enumeration must 
be deemed to be trope. And this takes place together with a personification: 
the consolidation, as an agency or power, of that violence that inscribes a dis-
placement as a sign. 
I 
',I J 
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Kristeva is led to describe a transference at the origin by a necessity 
whereby the language of rhetoric comes to be the precise terminology, and 
the most rigorous referent, for descriptions of the very accession to the possi-
bility of signification. What Kristeva, following Klein, is describing here as 
the infant's earliest approach to identity is none other than the laying down 
of a rhetorical system, a system linking personifications with tropes. Another 
word for "transference" would be metaphor (meta-phorein, to carryover or 
across). Another word for "displacement" would be metonymy, the trope 
that merely substitutes one thing for another of the same order-the trope 
into which a metaphor must not collapse. And the imagination of the pri-
mary identification with the gap as an identification with the father is an an-
thropomorphism, entailing (as in Ovid's Metamorphoses) the personification 
of a proper name (the name of the father), the conflation of an inscription 
and a person. Kristeva has reconstructed, in effect, a Freudian account of the 
subject's accession to meaning that makes up a narrative version of the an-
swer Nietzsche gives to the question "What is Truth?"; "A moving army of 
metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms." Her juxtaposition of 
Freud's texts reveals the disparity and the conflict among these functions; an-
thropomorphism enforcing the identity between metonymy and metaphor, 
between separation and signification. Kristeva would maintain the hetero-
geneity of the signifying process against its reduction to symbolization. But 
paradoxically, this heterogeneity is evoked most compellingly where she con-
fronts a problematic that might be thought to be internal to symbolization: 
where she engages (as in her interpretation of narcissism) in a rhetorical 
analysis of an epistemology which reveals itself to be a theory of rhetoric. 
"Poetic language/' as she recurrently rediscovers, is the widest-and most 
mistakeable-field of investigation. 
Derrida's essay "Freud and the Scene of Writing" revealed in the meta-
phors of writing in Freud's texts the disclosure of an originary "psychic writ-
ing," an originary repetition. Kristeva's rediscovery of a "transference" at the 
origin reveals the same logic. The emergence of the psychic takes place as 
writing, or "poetic language," not only in its material character as inscription 
and erasure (emphasized by Kristeva and by Derrida) but also in the other 
dimension of writing exacerbated by poetic language: its rhetorical character, 
its existence as trope and as persuasion. The "immediate identification" with 
the Imaginary Father would be the first "persuasion" as well as the first 
trope. Kristeva's Essay on Abjection, together with her essay on the constitu-
tion of the maternal as the abject, rediscovers the "multiplicity of agencies or 
origins" -displace\flent, transference, and personification; maternal relay, pa-
ternal metaphor-evoked in these terms by Derrida: "A two-handed ma-
chine, a multiplicity of agencies or origins-is this not the original relation to 
the other and the original temporality of writing, its "primary" complication: 
an originary spacing, deferring, and erasure of the simple origin, and polemics 
on the very threshold of what we persist in calling perception?" (Writing and 
Difference, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 226). 
Kristeva would trace the polemics of the "repudiation of femininity" 
("bedrock," for Freud), the rhetoric of anti-Semitism (in particular, O§line's), 
and that of other phobias and rituals, back to this "polemics," this rhetoric, 
"on the very threshold of perception." But she would also disentangle them. 
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She interrogates, for example, the social and cultural as well as personal in-
terests served by Freud's central discovery, the Oedipus complex. It came to 
light during the self-analysis Freud undertook in the wake of his father's 
death and the end of his own fathering of children, in 1897: it was this con-
junction that "led him to that telescoping of father and child resulting in 
none other than Oedipus" (DL, p. 275). Kristeva proposes reading Freud's 
discovery as "the discourse of mourning for his father's death": she asks, 
"could the discovery of the Oedipus complex .. have been produced 
through an inverted Oedipus complex?" But in a more far-reaching move, 
Kristeva goes on to suggest that Freud's father's actual death in 1897 was not 
a decisive factor. Could the conception of the Oedipus complex, rather, be 
"the negative of the guilt experienced by the son who is forced by the signifier 
to take his father's place"? The Oedipus complex is invented in response to 
the effect of a linguistic law; it serves as a narrative figure to explain effects 
of the proper name-to explain and account for the guilt that supervenes 
upon the subject's accession to language through the name of the father. And 
the conception of the Oedipal child has not only an explanatory but also a 
legitimating function. It makes the father's role of prohibiting desires appear 
essential and inevitable. "The Freudian conception of the child would thus 
provide the basis for paternal discourse, the solid foundation for the paternal 
function, and consequently the guarantee, both present and ultimate, of so-
cialization"; it is "lucidly presented to support the inevitability of the sym-
bolic and/or social code" (DL, pp. 274-75). Kristeva's analysis opens to 
attack the way the Oedipus theory has worked as a rationalization and psy-
chologization of the effects of a linguistic imperative: the inference it encour-
ages from the key function of the name of the father to the notion that 
father-figures and actual fathers must playa dominant symbolic and social 
role. 
Situating the emergence of subjectivity in the identification with (the 
mother's) feminine desire, Kristeva makes it possible for us to see the emer-
gence of symbolization through paternal prohibition as a "possible variant 
within," rather than as the foundation ot the signifying process. The paint-
ings of Giotto and Bellini are among the texts she reexamines for what they 
testify about the significance, within a tradition always supposed to repress 
it, of maternal jouissance: joy of desire, intimation of meaning. As Leon Rou-
diez observes in the glossary in his helpful introduction to Desire in Language 
(which includes "Giotto's Joy" and "Motherhood according to Giovanni Bel-
lini"), here Kristeva can call upon the workings of the signifier, for jouissance 
sounds as j'ou·is sens (I heard meaning). Kristeva argues that the subordina-
tion of forms to "the infinitesimal division of color and space" in Bellini's 
Madonnas suggests that the joy in pictorial representation arises as a painting 
provokes in us the primary narcissism or repression, the originary identifica-
tion with division, which is focused by maternal desire. 
The translators of Desire in Language and Powers of Horror have produced 
texts which do not smooth or flatten Kristeva's difficult prose, yet at mo-
ments manage elegance. The translators' interpretive decisions seem scrupu-
lous and reliable. For example, the rendering of the key word "manque" as 
"want" rather than "lack" catches Kristeva's distinctive stress on the psycho-
logical rather than simply the structural dimension of language. These trans-
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lations are valuable work. Their publication makes more available to us a 
provocative rereading of a diverse and crucial canon. 
Cornell University Cynthia Chase 
Representations of Revolution (1789-1820) by Ronald Paulson. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. 416 + 100 halftones. $29.95. 
A four-hundred-page commentary on one hundred fascinating illustra-
tions, Ronald Paulson's Representations of Revolution (1789-1820) follows the 
destruction of the body politic through representations of its dismemberment. 
Paulson proposes a theory to account for the historicat psychological, and 
aesthetic content of the art and literature of 1789-1820 and in so doing has 
expanded the notion of revolution to include the betrayal of family and love 
and the betrayal of genre in art. 
In the final chapter on Goya and the Spanish Revolution Paulson contrasts 
what is probably the most horrifying image in painting, Goya's Saturn eating 
his offspring in the Deaf Man's House (1820-23), with Rubens's Saturn of 
1636-37. Rubens's Saturn bends over the infant, taking the plastic breast into 
his bewhiskered mouth. The soft infant head lolls backwards to appeal to the 
spectator from upside down. The Rubens is disturbing enough as an image of 
patriarchal authority: yet in Goya's Saturn Paulson is able to align the histor-
ical and psychological problem of authority even more suggestively in what 
he calls the oral-anal pole of representations of revolution. This Saturn is not 
a bewhiskered old man with a staff but a grotesque monster, somewhere be-
tween the human and bestial, nightmarishly reminiscent of too many atroci-
ties. He is the father devouring the son, the people devouring the French 
king, and the ceaselessly revolving Spanish revolution devouring itself. The 
offspring here is not an infant but a grown man (Paulson says a king), whose 
head and one arm have already disappeared into the gaping black hole of the 
monster's mouth. The stump of the remaining arm is thrust into the giant's 
mouth like a bloody phallus. Before its restoration, Goya's Saturn apparently 
supported a monstrous erection, and still the effect is that he eats himself. 
It is this absent head, lost in the vacuum of the destroyed fatherland, that 
Paulson seeks in the images of cuckolded husbands, unfaithful wives and 
daughters, and dismembered legions: an absent head that is also the lack of 
aesthetic precedent. "The problem to be explored is: How does a writer or 
artist represent something he believes to be unprecedented-hitherto un-
known and unexperienced?" (1). The revolution in France-representations 
of it at horne (David) and in Spain (Coya) and representations of repressions 
of it in England (Blake, Rowlandson, Gillray, Lewis, Godwin, Wordsworth)-
is one testing ground, and the other is what may be called the aesthetic Un-
conscious. That is, the latent content of a representation of revolution may 
well be about the artist's revolt against the artistic traditions of the past. 
This book is therefore about revolution as something that subsumed-
or adapted-certain aesthetic categories and types of progression. But it 
]1 ___ _ 
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is also about the relationship between these aesthetic categories and 
the psychological categories to which they may refer. For if we can 
clear away all the detail ... we see ... two basic interpretations of the 
phenomenon of revolution in the period, or perhaps in any period. 
One is oedipal and the other is oral-anal. In one the son kills, devours, 
and internalizes the father, becoming himself the authority figure, pro-
ducing a rational sequence of events [e.g., Blake's progression from in-
nocence to experience to a higher innocence, Wordsworth's Prelude and 
Keats's Hyperion] . ... In the other the revolution is seen-in practice, 
in the very midst of it-as merely a regression to earlier stages of 
being, an ingestion that produces narcissism [as in Rowlandson, Gill-
ray, Goyal ... In one the effect is sublime or a progression ... from 
sublime to beautiful, in the other grotesque, moving toward the undif-
lerentiation 01 tyrant and oppressed [8]. 
Whether or not one wishes to quarrel with the psychoanalytic categories, 
there is little question of the significant difference between the two represen-
tations of revolution: Goya's grotesque, looming, shadowed Saturn barely 
differentiated Irom the offspring he eats (on the Iront 01 the dust jacket, the 
oral-anal interpretation) and Blake's sublime Orc in a sunburst, or "Glad 
Day" (on the back, the oedipal interpretation). 
As the quotation above suggests, Paulson also reconsiders genre, and this 
with an eye for gender. Early on, for example, it became clear that political 
repression included sexual and gender repression; so in chapter 3, on the de-
bate between Burke, Paine and Wollstonecraft on the Sublime and the Beau-
tilul, the Sublime is represented by the powerlul woman and the Beautilul by 
the weak Marie Antoinette. Thus the Queen's execution functions as the end 
of the Beautiful as an aesthetic category. In chapter 5, on the comic/pictur-
esque and lilled with Rowlandson's truly disturbing pictures 01 cuckolded la-
thers, energetic young lovers, and wives/daughters, Paulson asks, "For the 
question remains: Is the sexual-sensual act only a sublimation of revolution-
ary urges? ... Or when [the author/artistJ was thinking of revolution, was 
he in lact thinking only 01 drinking and lovemaking?" (150). II the pictur-
esque is a function of time, organic change, decay, and collapse (as in the old 
husband), the grotesque filled up the vacuum around representations of his-
tory. This plenitude or excess, a horror va cui, disrupted Rowlandson's work 
and became the mark of the ambivalent political caricaturist Gillray (chapter 
6). The Gothic (chapter 7) begins in the tension between Ireedom and com-
pulsion or revolution and tyranny, but it ends in a similar lack of differentia-
tion, and Paulson here finds useful Girardian theories of reciprocal violence. 
Rowlandson depicted the violence succeeding upon undifferentiation (be-
tween old husband and young lover); Gillray's political cartoons omitted 
Rowlandson's object of desire, the woman, and left only a Pitt and a Fox in 
senseless violence against John Bull; and Godwin entirely levels the master 
and the servant, or Frankenstein's monster functions as "the ultimate in the 
mergers we have seen of man and woman, father and son, master and ser-
vant, oppressor and oppressed, violence and victim: an amalgam that in-
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eludes Victor Frankenstein, the monster's creator and double" (247). At the 
heart of the Prelude (chapter 8), that marvelous piece of secondary revision or 
repression, narrative historicizing and final triumph over Miltonic epic (the 
ancien regime of poetry), are Wordsworth's revolutionary love (and counter-
revolutionary abandonment) of Annette Vallon, the revolution itself, his diso-
bedience to his father, and the making of a poet. Here Paulson historicizes 
Bloom's anxiety of influence as a formula more thinkable after the Revolu-
tion than before it. In Goya (chapter 9), the historical/personal/aesthetic par-
allels become equally manifest: the historical non-progression of the Spanish 
revolution; Goya's breakdown, deafness, and betrayal by the Duchess of 
Alba; and the striking "modernity" of his work. 
Predictably, shifting from aesthetic to political to psychological grids is not 
always smooth and convincing. Similarly, amid Paulson's wealth of detail 
from high and low art one cannot always see the forest for the trees and one 
occasionally wonders where all this sex, scatology, atrocity and iconoclasm is 
going to lead, or whether, like the Revolution, it will all just degenerate into 
an undifferentiated mass of literary criticism, art history, sociology and psy-
chology. Another problem, as Paulson well knows, for he is the great proble-
matizer of it, is the relationship between image and text-between the 
illustrations and Paulson's "readings" of them and between his selected art-
ists and authors. One may not find representations of women and vacuums 
as threatening as he does; nor, for that matter, do I find his representations of 
representations of women as probing as some recent treatments by women of 
revolutionary art in Representations and History Workshop Journal. 
But then perhaps Paulson's obvious and absolute authority in his field 
stands in his way, for certainly it is his voice, an eloquent,' mature, comfort-
able voice, which rises above the mass of revolutionary data. In fact, it is the 
voice of the father, one of the fathers of "new" eighteenth century studies, 
which is everywhere demonstrated by the myriad courtly footnotes. With its 
wealth of image and text (horror vacui?) and despite its subject matter, Paul-
son's is a very civilized book. On the other hand, as Paulson watches the 
scholars, and the wives and daughters, and the brutish monsters, and the 
young men, and the abysses, the comfortable voice is perhaps a veneer only 
-over revolutionary impulses, for the horror vacui also fills up the space 
with imaginary monsters. 
Stanford University Regenia Gagnier 
The Hegelian Aftermath. Readings in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Freud, Proust, and 
James by Henry Sussman. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1982. Pp. 260. $22.50. 
Commencing with a reading of Hegel's Phenomenology and proceeding 
through a series of nineteenth and early twentieth-century texts, Sussman is 
I concerned with neither the personal influences of intellectual history nor 
with the pressure of social forces on cultural production. Instead he presents 
the Hegelian work as a compendium of metaphors and tropes which struc-
&l( 
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ture and delimit the rhetorical activity of the subsequent authors. Hence 
Sussman's assurance that "the moving force in this history is not persons, 
authors or cultures but rather the limits of discursive possibility" (p. 3)-a 
statement which indisputably captures the author's exclusion of biographical 
and social history from his close readings but which still slightly misses the 
mark. For this "history" has no "moving force/' it does not move at all, trac-
ing instead the structures of literary and philosophical writing during the "ro-
mantic-modern" period extending from Hegel to Proust and James. During 
this period, no substantive progress, development or change occurs; rather 
the tropic possibilities and disjunctions inherent in the Phenomenology-"bi-
furcation, inversion, lateral displacement, the interiorization of the exterior, 
the exteriorization of the interior, reciprocity, the establishment of reciprocity 
out of difference, the introjection of difference into reciprocity, and the circu-
larization of linear sequences" (p. 20)-are played out in a rich variety of 
combinations. Thus the Phenomenology is divorced from its ostensible con-
tent, the history of consciousness, and approached instead with reference to 
the "possible conditions" of its own textuality, leading to a "Kantian read-
ing" (p. 21). Given this formalist limitation, Sussman is able to avoid engag-
ing in a polemic with the traditionally understood Hegel of absolute spirit 
and irresistable, dialectical progress. On the contrary, he directs his attention 
precisely toward the unresolved impasses, where the strategy of perpetual 
sublation is called into question; the Phe1lomenology is recognized as a poly-
phonic text constituted in the rhetorical tension between an omniscient narra-
tive voice and the fragmentation of certain tropes. This immanent crisis 
within the Hegelian text sets up the space in which anti-Hegelian criticism is 
subsequently generated, most notably in Kierkegaard. "The structure of inter-
locution [in Repetition] is more important than the 'identities' of the charac-
ters themselves" (p. 85), and that structure becomes Kierkegaardian irony, 
which for Sussman is as indebted to the Hegelian rhetorical forms as it is in-
tentionally hostile to Hegelian conceptualism (p. 101). 
Sussman goes on to trace the continuity of Hegelian tropes in modernist 
texts, and this continuity is considered more important than the clamorous 
insistence on some break with the nineteenth-century legacy: "Even if, fol-
lowing vorticism, all of modernism were to effect a decisive shift from sub-
stance to movement, from stasis to dynamic flow, like Ernst Fenallosa's 
ideograms, the lines of force revealed in the modernist current derive from 
the Hegelian physicS. Despite its pervasive aura of newness [ ... J, modernism 
does not revolutionize. At most it displaces and transposes the energy lines 
that prevailed in nineteenth-century speculation to the surface of poetry, 
prose and plastic material" (p. 209). Sussman attempts to demonstrate this 
transposition with reference to Proust's Recherche and with an especially 
compelling account of James's Turn of the Screw. Hegelian doubling and bi-
furcation explain the governess's visions, treated as "the schizoid mutuality 
of the relationship between the subject and the image" (p. 235). While re-
maining within the Hegelian order, the modernist text pushes at its limits by 
transforming the inherited tropes into aesthetic objects and, due to an explicit 
problematization of writing, by decentering the narration so as to anticipate 
post-modernist discursive activities. 
Despite its exciting textual explorations, Sussman's project does not escape 
r 
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some fundamental problems, which are not his alone but those of a whole 
critical school. First, the thorough exclusion of socio-historical material di-
vorces the texts from their historical context; romanticism and modernism 
apparently have nothing to do with the French Revolution, capitalism or the 
experience of urbanization. The new critical denigration of extrinsic factors as 
less important than intrinsic form seems endearingly tolerant in retrospect, 
when compared to the radical anti-historicity of deconstruction. Nor would a 
historical approach to the texts at hand necessarily imply a great leap, say, 
from Hegel to the Battle of Jena. The important recent work on the institu-
tional settings in which literature is produced and received could cast impor-
tant light on the problem of the rise of modernism. 
This idealism, which severs all links between tropic textuality and social 
being, is compounded, secondly, by a further idealism, which asserts the 
priority of a whole over concrete diversity. The catalogue of tropes in the 
Phenomenology is presented as an exhaustive map of subsequent textual rhet-
oric in the course of the "aftermath." The permutations and combinations of 
romantic-modern writing are all already embedded in the original text where 
they await an eventual exfoliation. Thus Kierkegaard's anti-Hegelianism is 
inserted into the Hegelian rhetoric, just as the modernist texts, which, as 
Sussman shows, problematize the inherited tropic forms, are subsumed by 
that inheritance. Similarly curious is the treatment of Walter Benjamin as a 
follower of Hegel which makes sense only on a level so abstract as to ignore 
fully the implications of the controversy with Adorno. After Hegel, it seems, 
nothing qualitatively new can occur, at least not during the romantic-modern 
period, because there is no outside to the epistemic structure and because the 
complexities of lived historical experience are disqualified as historical. 
Although Sussman's Hegelian tropes provide a rhetorical constitution of 
the period, it is interesting, if somewhat pedantic, to note how many likely 
candidates for a Hegelian reading are overlooked: Heine, Keller, Dilthey, Lu-
kacs and, conspicuous by his absence, Marx. Need it be pointed out that, be-
yond the arguments regarding Marx's substantive appropriations of Hegel, a 
remarkable rhetorical continuity can be observed, especially between the 
Logic and Capital? However, Sussman refers to Marxism only briefly when 
he introduces Baudrillard's critique of productivism (pp. 6-7), which he 
adapts in a telling manner. If Baudrillard denounces nineteenth-century 
Marxism's projection of contemporary productive modes onto the past, Suss-
man transforms the anti-productivism into an accusation of sterility directed 
against the romantic-modern period during which, allegedly, nothing new 
emerges. Yet this lack of innovation has less to do with the historical material 
than with a critical orientation toward synchronic structures and a frozen 
stasis, unperturbed by the restlessness of subjectivity. The modernist crisis of 
production, thematized, for example, in Doctor Faustus, is projected-a sur-
prisingly Hegelian trope for contemporary criticism-onto the pre-modern-
ism of the romantic nineteenth century. 
This projection is deeply implicated in the literary periodization put for-
ward by Sussman. The envisioned reconciliation of romantic and modern 
writing implies a deemphasis of the normally asserted break around the turn-
of-the-century. Modernism is thereby robbed of many of its emancipatory 
claims and, pushed back toward the nineteenth century, it is also implicitly 
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declared obsolete in the name of a post-modernism which begins to take 
shape at the conclusion of Sussman's book as the successor to the Hegelian 
episteme. Subjectivity, consciousness and history playas small a role in it as 
they do in Sussman's own post-modern account of modernism. 
Stanford University Russell A. Berman 
T. S. Eliot and the Poetics of Literary History by Gregory S. Jay. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 256. $27.50. 
"Shakespeare and T. S. Eliot ruined us alL" So writes Fausto Maijstral in 
the eleventh chapter of Thomas Pynchon's V. Now, with his own power and 
influence spreading, Pynchon is doing some ruination of his own, imposing 
his particular madcap archaeologies and heavily marked absences on the 
contemporary literary landscape. Literature as a curse, an invasion: this 
aper,u rightfully belongs to the last fifty years, though-what with Baude-
laire and others-it is by no means unique to them. It is now being institu-
tionalized both in literary theory and in poetry such as Ashbery's and fiction 
such as 'Pynchon's. Shakespeare, Eliot, Pynchon: "invaders" who dispense, 
in contemporary critical terms, a simultaneous power and paralysis, power as 
great as it is because it is paralytic in its effect. To quote that exemplary Mod-
ernist, Erik Satie: "Experience is one of the forms of paralysis." 
Gregory Jay's book on T. S. Eliot studies the processes by which Eliot 
wrung poetry out of paralysis brought on by an appreciation of past poets 
who had in some sense invaded him, taken him over. It goes without saying 
that such an invasion is also a deferral of one's own self, so that Eliot, in 
Jay's view-I am paraphrasing-never becomes "himself" at all. He is end-
lessly something else, a field, to put it in falsely allegorical terms, on which 
the past sends forth its troops. From what I have outlined here it should be 
evident that Jay has a second goal in mind: namely, to make Eliot an unoffi-
cial poet again, to strip him of the false ·logocentric authority he sometimes 
has seemed to project. The official Eliot (nostalgic for origins, yearning for 
Presence, setting down norms, a gatekeeper) is, according to Jay, too contra-
dictory ever to be able to embody the Presence he yearns for in any form at 
all in his work. Eliot is thus, in this agenda, stripped of his medals and made 
safe for deconstruction. 
Jay's efforts here in deconstructing Eliot's work seem intended to restore 
the poet to the place of theoretical importance from which he has been dis-
lodged by Pound, Williams, and Stevens, who can be viewed as poets of the 
Modern period who began to free poetry of its hunger for transcendence and 
sublimated absolutes. In Jay's version of these events, Eliot's "failure" to 
overcome his daemonic influences or to achieve consistency or "originality" 
makes him-surprise-a pasticheur or bricoleur worthy to be placed along-
side those masters of scissors-and-paste, Pound and Williams. What would 
be and is in Harold Bloom's terms a failure on Eliot's part turns instead into a 
success and makes Eliot into a kind of proto-Ashbery, whose efforts to 
achieve poetic authority are constantly undermined by history's refusal to be-
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come organic. Eliot, like Ashbery, ends up sounding like a man dres'sed up as 
a general, but who is not a general because there is no army. 
I should say at the outset that jay's book is highly intelligent, thorough, 
and absorbing. It is rewarding reading for anyone concerned with pivotal is-
sues in modernist and postmodernist poetry and critical theory. I am, how-
ever, more concerned with the problems it raises and the manner in which it 
does so; -its reach and quality clarify these problems. I will take the second 
and less important issue, its style or manner, first. Early on in this book it be-
comes clear that Jay has been invaded by his own ghosts: Derrida, Riddel, 
Lacan, and others. The book is written in a style of orthodox deconstruction. 
But there was never supposed to be a style of "orthodox deconstruction"; the 
whole process was meant to throw master-concepts into question, not to cre-
ate new ones as reference points. Nevertheless, throughout the book, one 
comes upon sentences such as the following: "What occurs, then, is both a 
dissemination and a coherence, since all the disparate re-marks from different 
genres belong nevertheless to their own corporate genre, that of textual indi-
cators that signal the presence of a genre and its historical corpus" (159). Or: 
"What is recalled, the original moment of ecstasy, was itself double at the or-
igin, originating and original precisely because it was beside itself and was 
the product of another time" (223). These sentences have been, as they al-
ways say, taken out of context, but they are justly representative of the style 
of the book as a whole. 
In the first sentence, the magisterial "then" out of Riddel, the Derridean 
"dissemination," the Heideggerean and Derridean loosening of the prefix in 
"re-marks," the Lacanian play over "corporate" and "corpus." signal consid-
erable corporate anxiety on the writer's part, especially since the sentence 
questions coherence only to reaffirm it. The second sentence characteristically 
plays, as Riddel tends to do at length, with the conjunction of "doubles" at 
the "origin," a way of saying that "origin" and "originality" are power-
words that do not mean what humanist commentators thought they meant. 
But notice how "original" in the second sentence is employed in such a way 
as to magically Qay says "precisely") re-emerge from under erasure to hold, 
if somewhat ironically, the place it has always already held. Time and again, 
Jay's prose seems to dismantle the reifications of traditional criticism, only to 
reinstall them in a slightly shifted place. For all its intelligence, Jay's prose is 
programmatic, the style of an acolyte. By being written in the way it is, Jay's 
book in effect accepts full authority, accepts such categories as "dissemina-
tion" as powerful givens, even as it denies the transcendental function of 
I these givens. 
l 
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Look at Jay's final paragraph on Four Quartets: 
The rose garden is on fire. The desire for unity, consummation, bliss, 
the eternal recurrence of the Same, undergoes its last askesis. Polyse-
mous, the emblem of the rose unites nature's Eros with poetry's theol-
ogy in order to refine the longings and delusions of both. As a knot of 
fire, the rose becomes an eternal flame of enlightened disillusionment, 
a process of love that gains energy from its losses of identity and grows 
strong in the repetition of other times it heatedly ingathers. Love, as 
the overcoming of self-consciousness and the repetition of an ancient 
---, 
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pattern in modern figures, renews itself just as the poem is renewed by 
entwining itself with its precursors. Purged of its illusions, the rose 
dances in the "tongues of flame" that repeat and inspire it, re-marking 
the measures of poetry and love (248). 
This is closer to The Cloud of Unknowing than to Of Grammatology. I have 
rarely in recent criticism seen so many poker chips thrown on the table as are 
here scattered in one paragraph. At the far point of dismantled metaphysics, 
deconstruction rediscovers the sublime. It is like finding Derrida at a seance. 
The accepted authority of the prose leads, it seems to me, to exactly this 
point of transfiguration and apotheosis. 
This points to what is, perhaps, a more fundamental problem in the book, 
the would-be deconstructor's unease with Eliot's literary-political views in 
such books as After Strange Gods and The Idea of a Christian Society. lay is at 
pains to indicate that Eliot's poems do more than reveal an empty center 
(contrasting his position with that of William Spanos); they disclose "the del-
icate fabric of feeling that this disclosure occasions in a particular imagina-
tion, in a particular place, at key moments in that imagination's life" (218). 
Thirty-two pages later, Eliot has "stolen" Yeats' and Dante's "authority and 
then makes it speak in his own measure, in the passage where Yeats' dancer 
moves in Dante's 'refining fire'" (240). This talk of the imagination and deli-
cate fabrics of feeling and of stealing authority is the language of power, and 
it is political, although lay doesn't apparently see it that way. 
The trouble is that you can't have it both ways: you can't simultaneously 
empty the language of Eliot's poetry of its logocentric impulses and then 
reify the figure of the poet, giving him a position of authority distinct from, 
as Jay says, "mere versifiers" (242). In effect, you do not throw into question 
pivotal concepts by treating them as if they were tokens of consciousness 
alone and ignoring the way they served or are serving political ends; after 
deconstruction, the privileged terms go on serving the same political ends. 
lay does not (and cannot) deconstruct After Strange Gods; that book, like 
Pound's Jefferson and/or Mussolilli, is so deeply embedded in the myths of 
cultural authority that deconstructing the text would leave it unaffected. One 
might as well deconstruct Mein Kampf or The Gulag Archipelago or Churchill's 
memoirs, for all the good it would do. The languages and modes of decon-
struction do not easily examine the mechanisms of power because intellectu-
ally the method is microscopic in its approach, held in a deathgrip to "texts." 
Gayatri Spivak's and Michael Ryan's recent efforts to align deconstruction 
with politics have produced techno-jargon of a very high order, mystifica-
tions so violent and intense as to qualify as terrorism. Jay's scanting of politi-
cal power in a book with "history" in· its title is characteristic of the failure of 
the followers of Derrida to come up with a coherent language to deal with 
aesthetic power in its relation to cultural power. Aesthetic power can still be 
seen as power, but it must be seen in its relatedness. In making this charge, I 
am not blaming Jay, whose book on its own terms I often find admirable; 
rather, I am repeating a charge that has been directed at deconstructionists 
before and which needs to be raised every time another statue of another 10-
gocentric giant comes crashing down into the city square. Jay's "literary his-
tory" seems at time to take place inside Eliot's famous test tube filled with 
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oxygen and sulphur dioxide; it rarely seems to be one (integral) manifestation 
of the flow of the world's power from one place to another. 
Wayne State University Charles Baxter 
